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The “Principle of Federalism” and
the Legacy of the Patriation and
Quebec Veto References
Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens∗
“You know the thing about Canada is it’s a federal country.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Possibly more than any other case of the late 1970s and early 1980s,
Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution2 revealed deep disagreements
within the Supreme Court as to the nature of Canadian federalism, the
normative consequences, if any, that can or should be drawn from the
principle of federalism, and the interplay between formal law and
informal law in adjudicating federalism-related cases.
This paper argues that the Court’s rulings in federalism cases since
the Patriation Reference, including the follow-up case of Reference re
Amendment of Canadian Constitution,3 have not really clarified these
areas of penumbra. In Part II, I examine the divergent conceptions of
federalism observable in the Patriation and Quebec Veto references. I
focus, in Part III, on the justices’ differing views on the usefulness and
justiciability of the principle of federalism in post-Patriation Reference
cases, notably by highlighting how they themselves use the two references
∗

Associate Dean, Research, and Canada Research Chair in North American and Comparative Juridical and Cultural Identities, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal. All rights reserved,
Gaudreault-DesBiens, 2011. I would like to thank Geneviève Beausoleil-Allard for the most helpful
background research she did for this paper, my colleague and friend Jean Leclair for his insightful
comments on a preliminary version of it, and, finally, Jamie Cameron and Bruce Ryder for their
equally helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
Chief Justice Brian Dickson in a conversation with Patrick Monahan, as quoted in Robert J.
Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 2003), at 269.
2
Reference re Amendment of Constituion of Canada, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R.
753 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”].
3
[1982] S.C.J. No. 101, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec Veto Reference”].
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that serve as springboards for this inquiry. Part IV then reveals, on the
one hand, the conspicuous absence of any strong consensus on the
normative consequences that flow, or should flow, from the principle of
federalism, and, on the other, that the legacy of the early 1980s references, if any, remains one of conflict rather than one of consensus. I
conclude that in a divided society with a weak common identity such as
Canada, this outcome is almost inevitable.4 However, I also argue that a
common syntax of federalism, revolving around core values underlying
the federal principle, could help buttress the quality of reasons invoked in
support of rulings made about the formal division of powers and, as a
result, the quality (understood here in terms of balance, consistency, and
openness to the diversity of perspectives on federalism) of federative
adjudication in the Canadian federation.
An important caveat must be made as to the objective and scope of
this paper. Indeed, it solely focuses on post-Patriation Reference cases in
which general ideas are uttered about federalism as a principle. It thus
ignores other cases where the analysis essentially remained in the
technical realm of the legal interpretation of the formal distribution of
powers, without ever referring to the federal principle. Neither does it
seek to reveal the possibly deliberate non-dits, or silences, of such cases.
For example, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ward5 offers a largely
technical account, grounded on an analysis of the interplay between the
federal jurisdiction over fisheries and the provincial jurisdiction over
property and civil rights, of a case dealing with the sale of seal pelts. In
overturning the Newfoundland Court of Appeal’s prior judgment through
the adoption of this technical-legal grid, the Court ends up obscuring the
identity concerns raised by the majority opinion in the appellate court’s
judgment, which inform its grasp of the interplay between the competing
federal and provincial jurisdictions at stake.6 There is thus a non-dit in
the Supreme Court’s ruling, but this non-dit somehow speaks volumes
since its object — in the case at bar, the iteration by Newfoundland’s
Court of Appeal of an identity narrative represented as peculiar to the
4

Obviously, it does not mean that conflicts are not a common feature of other less a priori
fragmented societies. Reflecting on justice in modern democratic societies, sociologist Alain
Touraine argues that justice results from compromises, as opposed to consensuses, his premise being
that social conflict rather than cooperation should be the springboard of social thought. See Alain
Touraine, Qu’est-ce que la démocratie? (Paris: Fayard, 1994), at 55, 90.
5
Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 21, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.).
6
R. v. Ward, [1999] N.J. No. 336, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 172 (Nfld. C.A.).
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province and relevant in constitutional interpretation — may also hide a
particular conception of federalism, or vision of the Canadian federation.
The choice of not revealing and further examining such non-dits merely
speaks to the particular objective of this paper, which is to purposively
simplify the law of federalism so as to focus on the principle of federalism as seemingly understood by the Supreme Court of Canada.
A second caveat must be made about the temptation to situate any
analysis of the federalism jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada
within the old “centralization versus decentralization” debate. I intend to
do my best to resist that temptation. First, this debate is Manichean. For
example, some constitutional scholars, mostly from Quebec, tend to
adopt, explicitly or not, the grid “decentralization equals good: centralization equals bad”, while others, mostly from other provinces, are
inclined to privilege an exactly reverse but equally predictable grid. With
all due respect, this is a bit short, intellectually speaking. Second, and
this flows from my first observation, any conclusion about centralization
or decentralization often implies adopting a perspective about what,
normatively speaking, Canada should be as a nation, rather than what
federalism may legally imply, or even demand, in the Canadian context.
Granted, absolute neutrality is illusory in such matters, but it bears noting
that a normative perspective on Canada and one of federalism, legally
understood, are not exactly similar. Arguably, the former is more likely to
lead one to systematically value decentralization or centralization over
the other, exactly as if decentralization or centralization were abstractly
valuable for their own sake. In my view, the claim that decentralization
or centralization is intrinsically good is intellectually indefensible, at
least in the legal realm, because it is not an argument, it is merely a
belief.7 Actually, both decentralization and centralization may be appropriate in certain circumstances, and problematic in others. I thus take
intellectual automatisms such as “more powers to the provinces” or
“more powers to the federal government” to be nothing but epistemological obstacles.8 This is why they need to be resisted, which does not mean
7

On the weakness of the argument that decentralization is abstractly beneficial, see R.
Howse, “Federalism, Democracy, and Regulatory Reform: A Skeptical View of the Case for
Decentralization” in K. Knop et al., eds., Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Governments in a Changing World (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), 273.
8
On the notion of “epistemological obstacle”, see Gaston Bachelard, La formation de
l’esprit scientifique. Contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective, 12th ed. (Paris:
Vrin, 1983).
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that stronger reasons leading to a “centralizing” or “decentralizing”
outcome, as appraised from an external political perspective,9 cannot be
entertained or even adopted.
It is therefore in light of these two caveats that this paper should be
read, and that any tentative conclusion on my part on whatever question
addressed in it should be appraised.

II. CONCEPTIONS OF FEDERALISM IN
THE EARLY 1980S REFERENCES
Let me briefly examine the various conceptions of federalism revealed in the Patriation Reference and Quebec Veto Reference.
Recall, first, that a little before the Patriation Reference, the Supreme
Court had issued an advisory opinion in Reference re Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada in Relation to the Upper House,10 where
it entertained various arguments about Parliament’s power to unilaterally
alter the composition and even the existence of the Senate. This hypothesis was rejected, inter alia on the basis of its incompatibility with the
“federal” character of Parliament. After commenting that the federal
unilateral power had been confined to “federal ‘housekeeping’” matters,
the Court noted:
The legislation contemplated in [the Senate reference] is of an entirely
different character. While it does not directly affect federal-provincial
relationships in the sense of changing federal and provincial legislative
powers, it does envision the elimination of one of the two Houses of
Parliament, and so would alter the structure of the federal Parliament
to which the federal power to legislate is entrusted under s. 91 of
the Act.11

Even before the early 1980s references, the Supreme Court had rejected in Blaikie the argument that the province of Quebec could legislate, as far as its own legislature and judiciary were concerned, against
the letter of section 133 of the British North America Act (as the Constitution Act, 1867 was then called)12 which, among other things, solely
9
For a most useful study of such perspectives, see R. Simeon, “Criteria for Choice in
Federal Systems” (1983) 8 Queen’s L.J. 131 [hereinafter “Simeon”].
10
[1979] S.C.J. No. 94, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 (S.C.C.).
11
Id., at 65-66.
12
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
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imposed bilingualism on that province and on Parliament, at the exclusion of other provinces.13 More precisely, as far as Quebec was (and still
is) concerned, this obligation applied to its legislature, its records and
journals, the publication and printing of the Acts adopted by it, as well as
the province’s judiciary. In a nutshell, the province sought, in a series of
provisions of the Charter of the French Language,14 to make French the
only official language of the legislature and courts, thus restricting the
right to use English, or its status, in both areas. Its argument was essentially grounded upon its power to amend its own constitution, but the
Court dismissed it, arguing that even though this constitutional obligation
of bilingualism was only imposed on Quebec and Parliament, this
obligation enshrined a political agreement that was somehow constitutive
of Canada itself and that transcended the interests of the particular
province upon which these specific obligations were imposed. Accordingly, these obligations were beyond the legislative reach of the Quebec
National Assembly since section 133 was part of the “Constitution of
Canada” rather than part of the constitution of the province.
Federalism was not predominantly at stake in Blaikie, but the Supreme
Court’s implicit reference, through the adoption of Deschênes J.’s historical narrative in the judgment below, to a covenant deemed to be constitutive of the Canadian “federal union” certainly speaks to a certain
conception of that union and constitutes a recognition of the partly
contractarian dynamic inherent to federalism, which may be acknowledged
even when formal constitutional provisions do not clearly reveal it.
In any event, like Banquo’s ghost in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, it
would return to the fore, and glowingly so, in the Patriation Reference.15
The dispute at the heart of this reference was whether the federal government was required to secure provincial consent prior to amendments
that would later lead to the Constitution Act, 1982,16 given the deadlocked negotiations with provinces.
A seven-judge majority summarily dismissed the legal argument, arguing, in essence (1) that compact theories, in whatever variation, were
not relevant, or only marginally so, to the interpretation of a British law,17
13
Blaikie v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1979] S.C.J. 85, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Blaikie”].
14
R.S.Q., c. C-11.
15
Supra, note 2.
16
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
17
Supra, note 2, at 803-804.
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(2) that no particular normative consequence could be drawn from the
reference in the preamble of the British North America Act to a “federal
union” and that such consequences should instead be drawn from the
enunciation of the normative part of the Act’s formal text18 (3) that,
accordingly, no “standardized” conception of a federal regime could
allow one to infer such consequences19 (4) that the internal division of
powers does not have any external impact, and (5) that the federal
characteristics of Canada were not jeopardized by the federal initiative
examined by the Court. For their part, Martland and Ritchie JJ., dissenting, would have found inspiration in the federal principle to draw the
conclusion that, in the context of a constitutional amendment impacting
on provincial powers, sovereignty in Canada was exercisable only
through the joint expression of the federal Parliament and of the provincial legislatures.20
However, a differently constituted six-judge majority, which broadly
understood the Canadian Constitution as a global system of rules and
principles governing the allocation and exercise of constitutional powers
within the Canadian state and within each of its parts, held that there was
a constitutional convention requiring a “substantial degree of provincial
consent” since the proposed amendments “directly affected federalprovincial relationships in the sense of changing provincial legislative
powers”. They found that the reason for this convention was to be found
in the federal principle.21 Even if Canada would remain a federation were
the amendments envisaged by the federal government adopted, that
federation would have changed and, absent provincial consent, such a
process went against constitutional conventions. A minority of three
judges argued, on the contrary, that the alleged convention would unduly
limit the sovereign powers of the federal executive and legislative
branches,22 and that the particular type of federalism that was created by
the British North America Act granted a form of supremacy to Parliament, as opposed to what is found in other federations.
Thus, on the legal issue, the majority resorts to a positivist-literalist
understanding of the British North America Act in its refusal to rely on a
generically defined federal principle as a potential interpretive-normative
18
19
20
21
22

Id., at 806.
Id.
Id., at 847.
Id., at 905.
Id., at 859.
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and legally binding source.23 Three of the judges comprised in this
majority, Laskin C.J.C., and Estey and McIntyre JJ., express a dissenting
opinion on the conventional argument, essentially to the same effect:
resorting to a form of Canadian exceptionalism,24 they are of the view
that the very nature of Canadian federalism gave Parliament a preeminent position within the federation. Transposing the “no standard
federalism” argument into the conventional analysis, they refuse to draw
normative consequences, even in the political realm, from an abstract,
generically defined, principle of federalism.
On the legitimacy of the use of a more abstract conception of federalism as an interpretive-normative source, we therefore get the
following picture: three judges (Laskin, Estey and McIntyre JJ.) are
consistently and staunchly against it in both legal and conventional
realms, while two judges (Martland and Ritchie JJ.) support it in both
realms. The four remaining judges (Dickson C.J.C., Beetz, Chouinard
and Lamer JJ.) support it only in the conventional realm. Of course,
these positions were not necessarily determinative of what all these
judges did in later cases arising out of different contexts. Yet, two
dominant conceptions of federalism arguably emerge from these
various opinions, irrespective of the actual justiciability of the normative source involved. Interestingly, these two conceptions are somewhat
reminiscent of the ones competing in the old Privy Council’s case of
Hodge.25
The first one, which could be characterized as Laskinian, conceives
of the federation as a governmental structure in which the federal
government is at the helm and where provinces are subordinated to its
will, at least in most important respects. The primordial and transcendent
political community is thus the pan-Canadian one, which coincidentally
happens to be segmented into provinces. This is what could be called a
positivist-voluntarist conception of federalism, where the will inspiring
the creation of the polity is deduced from the formal statute creating the

23
William R. Lederman characterized, correctly in my view, the majority opinion as “narrowly positivistic and historically static”. See W.R. Lederman, “The Supreme Court of Canada and
Basic Constitutional Amendment” in K. Banting & R. Simeon, eds., And No One Cheered:
Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983), at 180.
24
The word “exceptionalism” was coined by sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset to describe
one of the defining features of American political ideology. See generally Seymour Martin Lipset,
American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996).
25
Hodge v. R. (1883) 9 A.C. 117 (J.C.P.C.).
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federation26 and from a predetermined conception of the federation
where the federal government has the sole power to determine where the
national interest lies and to define what the federal common good is. It is,
in a nutshell, a Canadian nationalist conception of federalism. An
alternative account of that positivist-voluntarist conception of federalism
could be that the formal statute, as unclear as it may sometimes be, is
nevertheless reified and instrumentalized to buttress such a nationalist
interpretation of Canadian federalism. It is thus more than a mere
literalist conception of federalism that is at stake here — hence, the
emphasis on voluntarism. Indeed, the textual anchor provided by the
Constitution Act, 1867 is way too loose to solidly ground any persuasive
literal argument supporting that particular vision of federalism, or, for
instance, any competing one.
The second one, which I would call generic-historicist, envisages
federations as structures where the federal and federated levels of
government are co-equals, and coincidentally finds that such is the case
with the Canadian federation in spite of some explicit provisions to the
contrary, which are somehow treated (and then obscured) as unpleasant
normative facts. Although this conception of federalism can hardly aspire
to a greater level of axiological neutrality than the previous one, its
assumption of co-equality between the two levels of government does
not entail that legitimate decision-making implies unanimity, even where
26

The following quotation illustrates that positivist approach:
At the risk of undue repetition, the point must again be made that constitutionalism in a
unitary state and practices in the national and regional political units of a federal state
must be differentiated from constitutional law in a federal state. Such law cannot be ascribed to informal or customary origins, but must be found in a formal document which is
the source of authority, legal authority, through which the central and regional units function and exercise their powers.
The constitution of Canada, as has been pointed out by the majority, is only in part
written, i.e. contained in statutes which have the force of law and which include, in addition to the British North America Act (hereinafter called the B.N.A. Act), the various other
enactments which are listed in the reasons of the majority. Another, and indeed highly
important, part of the constitution has taken the form of custom and usage, adopting in
large part the practices of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and adapting them to the
federal nature of this country. These have evolved with time to form with the statutes
referred to above and certain rules of the common law a constitution for Canada. This
constitution depends then on statutes and common law rules which declare the law and
have the force of law, and upon customs, usages and conventions developed in political
science which, while not having the force of law in the sense that there is a legal enforcement process or sanction available for their breach, form a vital part of the constitution without which it would be incomplete and unable to serve its purpose.
See Patriation Reference, supra, note 2, at 852-53.
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federal-provincial relationships are affected “in the sense of changing
provincial legislative powers”. By not finding that unanimous provincial
consent was needed on the proposed federal amendments, the judges
adopting that position held that legitimacy in a federation is contextual
and ultimately raises questions of reasonableness and proportionality.
They thus imposed limits on the potential reach of provincial federalismbased arguments, as they had imposed limits on the hegemonic ambitions
of the federal government when it came to amending the Constitution.
By so doing, they affirmed a conception of the federation that took stock
of its irreducibility, as a sovereign legal entity, to any of the orders of
government, and to the need to prevent its instrumentalization by any
such order of government.
The refusal to impose provincial unanimity as a benchmark for a
constitutional amendment of the magnitude of that envisaged implied
that no particular province could alone pretend to have a right of veto
over the process. As far as the convention based on the federal principle
was concerned, the only requirement was a quantitative one of substantial consent. This raised the question of the possibility of qualitative
requirement, and that question was examined in the 1982 Quebec Veto
Reference.27
In this reference, Quebec argued that the province had a conventional
veto over the amending process which was grounded on the principle of
Canadian duality as understood in its “Quebec dimension”, that is, taking
into consideration that several historical and contemporary social facts
bore witness to the distinctiveness of Quebec society within the federation.28 The Supreme Court did not feel compelled to examine this
argument, because it had earlier found that there was no evidence that the
relevant constitutional actors had accepted or recognized a consistent
political practice of a Quebec veto over any constitutional amendment
affecting its powers. The problem is that by so deciding, the Court
imposed a higher evidentiary standard than it had done in the Patriation
Reference, where it had acknowledged that acceptance of a conventional
rule could be merely inferred from constitutional practice. Normatively
speaking, the Court would have arguably been on stronger ground had it
decided to resort to the principle of federalism to reject the idea that a
single federated unit, albeit significantly different from the others
27
28

Supra, note 3.
Id., at 812-13.
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sociologically and historically, enjoyed an unqualified veto over constitutional amendments. Of course, such an argument would have been
debatable, but it would at least have been straightforward and thus less
open to accusations of bias.29
The Court’s opinion in the Quebec Veto Reference badly bruised its
image in this province, to such an extent that “the general court of appeal
for Canada instantly became ‘la Cour des Autres’ (the Others’ Court)”.30
This came about not only as a result of what was perceived as a judicially
created double standard, but also as a result of the Court’s implicit burial
of Quebec’s dominant bi-national narrative of the federation, after its
prior rejection, as “non-juridical”, of the compact theory in the Patriation
Reference.31 For many Quebeckers, it was the beginning of the end of a
certain Canadian dream, to paraphrase political scientist Guy Laforest,32
and all Canadians are still living with the political-constitutional consequences of this burial. That one does not personally subscribe to the
victimization narrative that has become widespread in Quebec since
1982 should not prevent him or her from seeing that there still is a lot of
water in the basement of the Canadian house.

III. AN AMBIGUOUS STANCE ON THE USEFULNESS AND
JUSTICIABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM
AS AN INTERPRETIVE LEGAL CONCEPT
Can the idea of federalism, envisaged from the standpoint of its normative potential, be relied upon to privilege one interpretation of the
formal division of powers over another? As was just seen, the Patriation
29
On these questions, see M.E. Gold, “The Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in
the Supreme Court of Canada” in E. Belobaba & E. Gertner, eds. (1985) 7 S.C.L.R. 455. For a
strong defence of asymmetry in multinational federations, see Alain-G. Gagnon, Au-delà de la
nation unificatrice: plaidoyer pour le fédéralisme multinational (Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis
Autonomics, 2007).
30
S. Choudhry & J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Frank Iacobucci as Constitution-Maker:
From the Quebec Veto Reference, to the Meech Lake Accord and the Quebec Secession Reference”
(2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 165, at 178. Legal philosopher Alexandre Kojève argues that the intervention of a
disinterested third party is at the root of the very idea of justice and that it is constitutive of the law
itself. See Alexandre Kojève, Esquisse d’une phénoménologie du droit (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), at
24. From that perspective, the very perception of an interest on the part of the third party suffices to
undermine its decisions and, more broadly, one’s perception of the law and of its legitimacy.
31
Patriation Reference, supra, note 2, at 803-804.
32
Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995).
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Reference evinced a certain malaise within the Supreme Court as to the
usefulness and even the justiciability of the principle of federalism as a
normative-interpretive concept. What happened next? The Supreme
Court’s case law is inconclusive at best. Indeed, some opinions seem to
vest this principle with a normative content, while others ignore it or
deny its relevance.
Two rulings clearly reject the relevance of relying on the principle of
federalism for the purpose of interpreting a constitutional provision or for
framing a debate about the validity of a federal unilateral action significantly affecting provincial interests.
In Beauregard v. Canada,33 the Supreme Court had to examine the
constitutionality of a federal statute imposing upon superior court judges
an obligation to contribute to their pension fund. A generic, federalismbased argument was made in view of persuading the Court that the
modification contemplated actually required a constitutional amendment
supported by the appropriate degree of provincial consent. Rejecting this
argument, the Supreme Court held that the non-ambiguous nature of the
applicable constitutional provisions rendered irrelevant any reliance on a
broader federalism-based argument. That being said, it bears noting that
these constitutional provisions were only peripherally connected with
provincial interests, and that the impact of the modification contemplated
could not seriously be characterized as raising significant questions from
the standpoint of the federation’s equilibrium.
The situation was quite different in the Canada Assistance Plan Reference,34 in which the Supreme Court had to rule on the constitutionality
of a federal statute unilaterally capping the federal government’s financial contribution to some provinces under the Canada Assistance Plan. A
generic federalism-based argument had been made about the negative
externalities that this unilateral federal action had imposed upon the
provinces. Speaking for the entire Court, Sopinka J. summarily dismissed
that argument:
This was the argument that the “overriding principle of federalism”
requires that Parliament be unable to interfere in areas of provincial
jurisdiction. It was said that, in order to protect the autonomy of the
provinces, the Court should supervise the federal government’s exercise
33

[1986] S.C.J. No. 50, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 (S.C.C.).
Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (British Columbia), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 525 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canada Assistance Plan Reference”].
34
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of its spending power. But supervision of the spending power is not a
separate head of judicial review. If a statute is neither ultra vires nor
contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the courts
have no jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of legislative power.35

Under this view, which is largely informed by the principle of parliamentary supremacy, the normative consequences of federalism begin and
stop with the formal division of powers, and any reflection on these
consequences should take place only where questions of constitutional
validity are raised.36 This highly positivistic position is reminiscent of
that adopted by the majority on the legal question in the Patriation
Reference, notably in its reductionist approach to the supervisory role of
the judiciary regarding the practice of federalism. Unless questions of
validity are formally raised, the resolution of disputes regarding that
practice is left to the political process. Justice Sopinka’s approach in the
Canada Assistance Plan Reference is even closer to that of the three
dissenters on the conventional issue in the Patriation Reference, for
whom no judicially cognizable norm, be it characterized as legal or
conventional in nature, can ever impede that process. To say the least,
this judicial “hands-off” approach seems to entrust the political process
with many virtues that may not always manifest themselves in the daily
life of federations. It is as if a judicial intervention would necessarily, and
negatively, disturb the putative harmony of this idealized political
process. Perhaps more significantly, however, it is as if concerns for
federalism were somehow less important than other concerns with an
equivalent constitutional status. For example, no effort whatsoever is
made to seriously address the possibility of a reconceptualization of the
principle of parliamentary supremacy and of the doctrine of legitimate
expectations in light of the federal structure of Canada.
In other cases, however, arguments grounded on the principle of federalism were accepted either by the whole Court, by a majority of the
Court, or in dissent.
Such was the case in R. v. S. (S.),37 where the principle of federalism
was relied upon to counter an argument based on Canadian Charter of
35

Id., at 567.
Interestingly, a distinction here seems to be made between conflicts of jurisdictions and
conflicts of interests, in the sense that while provincial interests may have been severely affected in
the Canada Assistance Plan Reference, id., the provinces’ constitutional jurisdictions were not,
strictly speaking.
37
[1990] S.C.J. No. 66, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254 (S.C.C.).
36
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Rights and Freedoms38 equality rights that sought to persuade the Court
that the Young Offenders Act,39 which allowed provinces to set up
rehabilitation programs, discriminated against residents of provinces that
had refused to do so. The Supreme Court invoked federalism as a
justification for legitimizing, as respectful of the diversity inherent to a
federation, a federal statute which allowed for the expression of diverse
public policies reflecting different provincial sensibilities. The Court
added that federalism does not require uniformity, and that section 15 of
the Charter could not be used to challenge a differential treatment based
on the province of residence merely because it is different. In another
case involving the Charter rather than the federal division of powers, the
Court followed a similar logic when it upheld the constitutionality of a
Quebec statute restricting freedom of association, notably in light of the
province’s particular history of labour relations.40 The federal principle
was characterized as allowing for the expression of common values
susceptible to being implemented differently depending on the province
involved and its particular context.
The legal situation examined in the last two cases only incidentally
raised questions pertaining to federalism. In contrast, these questions
were front and centre in a 1993 case where the Supreme Court again had
to tackle the problem of federal unilateralism, albeit in a context quite
different from those of the Patriation Reference or of the Canada
Assistance Plan Reference.
In the Ontario Hydro case,41 the Court had to address the scope of
Parliament’s unilateral and discretionary power to declare works for the
general advantage of Canada.42 Justice Iacobucci, with whom three
judges concurred on the legitimacy of relying on the federal principle for
interpretive purposes in the case at bar,43 expressed the following view,
relying on the Patriation Reference as to the relevance of the federal
principle in that case:
38

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c.11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
39
S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 110.
40
R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.).
41
Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ontario Hydro”].
42
Such a declaration has the effect of unilaterally transferring under federal jurisdiction the
work which was initially under provincial jurisdiction.
43
Supra, note 41. Justices Cory and Sopinka co-signed Iacobucci J.’s opinion, while Lamer
C.J.C. agreed with him in a separate opinion as far as the principles were concerned.
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The federal principle cannot be reconciled with a state of affairs where
the modification of provincial legislative powers could be obtained by
the unilateral action of the federal authorities. … While the use of the
declaratory power is not as dramatic as the unilateral amending of the
Constitution, in my view the federal principle should be respected
nonetheless. Parliament’s jurisdiction over a declared work must be
limited so as to respect the powers of the provincial legislatures but
consistent with the appropriate recognition of the federal interests
involved.44

However, La Forest J., writing for himself and two other judges, rebutted his colleague’s claim that courts should narrowly construe the
declaratory power because of the dangers it posed to Canada’s federal
structure:
It was argued that the declaratory power must be read narrowly to make
it conform to principles of federalism. There is no doubt that the
declaratory power is an unusual one that fits uncomfortably in an ideal
conceptual view of federalism. But the Constitution must be read as it is,
and not in accordance with abstract notions of theorists. It expressly
provides for the transfer of provincial powers to the federal Parliament
over certain works.
…..
The restricted view advanced here for the first time appears to be based
on the danger thought to be posed to the structure of Canadian federalism
if the courts do not confine federal power in this area. … But more
fundamentally I think the argument evinces a misunderstanding of the
respective roles of law and politics in the specifically Canadian form of
federalism established by the Constitution. …
It is the very breadth of these powers that protects against their frequent
or inappropriate use. It was not the courts but political forces that dictated
their near demise. They are, as was said of the power of disallowance,
“delicate” and “difficult” powers to exercise and “will always be
considered a harsh exercise of power, unless in cases of great and
manifest necessity ...” … Their inappropriate use will always raise grave
political issues, issues that the provincial authorities and the citizenry
would be quick to raise. In a word, protection against abuse of these

44

Id., at 404.
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draconian powers is left to the inchoate but very real and effective
political forces that undergird federalism.45

Justice La Forest went on to say that he could not see in the Patriation Reference anything that contradicted this last assertion:
I see nothing in the statement in Reference re Resolution to Amend the
Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, to the effect that a substantial
measure of provincial consent was required before the Constitution
could be amended that is in any way at odds with this. For the Court in
that case made it clear that it was not within its province to enforce this
requirement. It was, it noted, a convention. The enforcement of
conventions lies in the political, not the legal field. They can be broken,
and the courts have no power to prevent this, but there is a political
price to pay. The courts have not engaged in the task of defining the
manner in which these broad political bases of Canadian federalism
should be protected. The Constitution has not accorded them that
mandate. These are matters for the people. This is not to say that the
courts do not have an important, indeed essential, role in balancing
federalism as they go about their task of defining the nature and effect
of those great but more subtle powers, not susceptible of definition and
direction by those elemental political forces that undergird Canadian
federalism.46

This excerpt of La Forest J.’s opinion reveals that while he supports a
reference to the principle of federalism, he seems reluctant to use it as a
normative standard that could serve as an intrinsic limit to the heads of
power explicitly allocated in the Constitution Act, 1867.47 It is worth
noting in this respect that he proved less reluctant to rely on it as an
extrinsic limit in his application of the national concern branch of
Parliament’s power to legislate for the peace, order and good government
to the particular facts of the Crown Zellerbach case.48 Dissenting in this
case, he expressed the view that attributing to Parliament exclusive
jurisdiction over environmental pollution would sacrifice the principles
of federalism enshrined in the Constitution. Justice La Forest seemed to
45

Id., at 370-72 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
47
This somehow echoes his majority opinion in R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.), where he again seemed reluctant to rely on a generic conception of
federalism and emphasized the need to understand this principle as it is reflected within the
Canadian federal context.
48
R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at paras. 6971 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Crown Zellerbach”].
46
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opine that the federal principle implies a requirement of proportionality
and balance, both in the actions of governments and in the outcomes that
courts reach when interpreting the division of powers in light of a claim
with potentially drastic ramifications.
In Crown Zellerbach, La Forest J. uses federalism as an interpretive
principle. In Ontario Hydro, he clearly manifests a reluctance to further
expand its reach and to grant it a full-fledged legal status. Yet, despite the
learned judge’s concerns, it remains that a majority of judges in the latter
case were inclined to give it such a status, thereby transforming it from a
mere principle of political morality to a legal principle limiting the ways
in which an undisputed constitutional power can be exercised. Under that
view, the principle of federalism is envisaged as an interpretive legal
principle.
The next case where the principle of federalism played a significant
role is the famous Quebec Secession Reference,49 which provides a
watershed moment as far as the legal status of that principle is concerned. To be first noted in this advisory opinion is the fact that a
unanimous Supreme Court reiterates the definition of the “Constitution”
that was adopted by the majority on the conventional question in the
Patriation Reference.50 The Court then uses the principle of federalism as
one of the four principles forming a super-structural analytical framework for the question of secession. It observes, unsurprisingly, that
federalism is a means to reconcile unity with diversity,51 as it grants
federated units a sphere of autonomy that allows them to develop their
societies.52 Federalism also institutionalizes different levels of political
communities, all legitimized to make decisions in their respective areas
of jurisdiction.53 As far as the particular question of Quebec is concerned,
the Court seems eager to reinforce its legitimacy in the province after the
Patriation Reference and the Quebec Veto Reference, by explaining the
creation of the Canadian federation and its institutions by and large as a
response to Quebec’s social and demographic distinctiveness within
Canada.54 Most interesting, however, is the fact that the Supreme Court
49

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Quebec Secession Reference”].
50
Id., at para. 32, citing the Patriation Reference, supra, note 2.
51
Id., at para. 43.
52
Id., at para. 58.
53
Id., at para. 66.
54
Id., at para. 59.
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recognizes in the Secession Reference that the principles upon which it
bases its analysis, including the federal principle, are normative and may
in some circumstances give rise to general or specific substantive legal
obligations and thus limit government action.55 Although it insists that
the written text of the Constitution shall prevail over such principles,56
the text of many constitutional provisions remains rather vague or subject
to different interpretations, thereby creating an opening for the use of
these principles.57 Even though the Court remains ambiguous on which
principle can be judicially enforced, and in which circumstances,58 the
fact remains that the Secession Reference clarifies the legal status of the
principle of federalism and its primarily interpretive function. It shies
away, though, from treating it as a free-standing principle that would
alone give rise to obligations and impose duties on governmental
actors.59
The language used in the Secession Reference about the principle of
federalism is broadly reminiscent of that used in the majority opinion on
the conventional question in the Patriation Reference. One question that
it raises, however, and that remains unanswered to this day, is to what
extent constitutional conventions based on the principle of federalism
and recognizable under the Patriation Reference’s analytical grid could
now be vested with a formal legal, rather than merely political, status in
the post-Secession Reference world. This further raises the question of
the judiciary’s role in the recognition of breaches of such a principle.
Could, for instance, the logic underlying the judicial recognition of
conventions as expounded in the Patriation Reference be extended to the
principle of federalism? More precisely, could a governmental actor ask a
court of law for a declaratory judgment that the principle of federalism
has been disrespected as a result of the actions of another governmental
actor, even when no formal division of powers argument is made? This
would again raise the question of the possibility of treating the principle
55

Id., at para. 54.
Id., at para. 53.
57
J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Quebec Secession Reference and the Judicial Arbitration of Conflicting Narratives About Law, Democracy and Identity” (1999) 24 Vermont L. Rev. 792,
at 825-26 [hereinafter “Gaudreault-DesBiens, ‘Quebec Secession Reference’”].
58
For this type of analysis, see generally J. Leclair, “Canada’s Unfathomable Unwritten
Constitutional Principles” (2001-2002) 14 Queen’s L.J. 389.
59
This is also the view that was adopted about another principle, that of the protection of
minorities, in Baie d’Urfé (Ville) v. Québec (Procureur général), [2001] J.Q. no 4821, [2001] R.J.Q.
2520 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2001] C.S.C.R. no 524 (S.C.C.).
56
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of federalism as a free-standing legal principle, but with a limited
enforceability potential when treated as such.
That being said, post-Secession Reference cases have not dealt with
these questions and have tended instead to treat the federal principle as
an interpretive tool justifying distinctions between a merely legitimate
interpretation of the division of powers and a better one. As such, it has
almost become a conflict rule between two possible interpretations. That
is how it was used, inter alia, in the Canadian Western Bank case,60
where the majority opinion held, relying on that principle, that the
interpretation of the division of powers should facilitate the legitimate
interaction of both levels of government and support cooperative
federalism. It also advocated a narrow interpretation of the doctrine of
jurisdictional exclusiveness, arguing that the historical asymmetry of its
application threatened subsidiarity, which was envisaged as consubstantial to federalism.61
The principle of federalism was also relied upon in very recent cases,
where its interpretive status was not really challenged: Assisted Human
Reproduction Act Reference62 and Lacombe.63 What is striking in these
cases, however, is the extent to which deep disagreements emerged within
the Supreme Court regarding the normative consequences to be drawn
from the otherwise innocuous and amorphous principle of federalism.

IV. THE ABSENCE OF ANY STRONG CONSENSUS
ON THE NORMATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM
The post-Patriation Reference case law invoking the principle of
federalism reveals the existence of some interpretive consensuses within
the Supreme Court of Canada. However, they all stand at a very high
level of generality, bordering on triteness.
60

Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]; see also British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge
Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.).
61
Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 45. See also Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, at para. 44 (S.C.C.), per
Deschamps J.
62
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R.
457 (S.C.C.).
63
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lacombe”].
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The most important and recurrent one is that federalism should be
understood, to the extent possible, as implying that both levels of
government, whenever they can reasonably claim jurisdiction over one
aspect or another of a matter, should enjoy as much legislative space as
possible. This has primarily been done through an expansive application
of the double aspect doctrine,64 at the expense of a strict application of
the doctrine of jurisdictional exclusiveness.65 This interpretive trend is
somewhat antecedent to the early 1980s references, but it has been
reinforced since, notably through the promotion in recent cases of a more
restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.
This narrow interpretation seeks to prevent the creation of jurisdictional
“enclaves”. As well, the confirmation of this doctrine’s possible application to provincial areas of jurisdiction has theoretically restored some
balance or symmetry between the federated and federal levels of government.66 However, the real normative strength67 of this revamped
interpretation of interjurisdictional immunity remains questionable in
light of the fact that two recent cases of 2010 blatantly contradict it. At
the very least, they evince the resilience of an “exclusivist” conception of
federalism as solely benefitting the federal government.68
In spite of that, the Supreme Court’s overwhelming preference for an
“overlapping” conception of federalism can hardly be challenged. To the
extent that such a conception is not used to mask a quiet and unprincipled
64
See Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission), [1989] S.C.J. No. 84, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225 (S.C.C.); Mitchell v. Peguis Indian
Band, [1990] S.C.J. No. 63, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 (S.C.C.); Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada
(Minister of Transport), [1992] S.C.J. No. 1, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997]
S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.); Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] S.C.J.
No. 19, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.); NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C.
Government and Service Employees’ Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “NIL/TU,O”].
65
This trend, which has been prevalent for at least 30 years or so, has been well documented by B. Ryder in “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism:
Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 309 and “The End
of Umpire? Federalism and Judicial Restraint” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2006)
34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 345.
66
See the majority opinions in Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 60, esp. at para. 45;
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., supra, note 60, Chatterjee v. Ontario
(Attorney General), supra, note 64; Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of
Teamsters, [2009] S.C.J. No. 53, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407 (S.C.C.).
67
On the concept of “normative strength”, see generally Catherine Thibierge et al., eds., La
force normative. Naissance d’un concept (Paris & Brussels: L.G.D.J. & Bruylant, 2009).
68
See Deschamps J.’s opinion in Lacombe, supra, note 63, at paras. 110 and 184-186. See
also Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., supra, note 61.
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take-over of the jurisdictions allocated to one level of government by the
other, it arguably better fits with the spirit of federalism,69 which emphasizes the autonomy of both federal and federated levels of government
while taking stock of the constitutional need to prevent the subordination
of one by the other, and which acknowledges that a federation is more
than a collection of loosely linked autonomous entities: it is in itself an
overarching legal order, albeit an internally plural one.
Yet, this overlapping conception of federalism merely refers to a
broad attitude towards the interpretation of the division of powers, and
does not say much about the normative consequences of the principle of
federalism. The same can be said about the link between federalism and
cooperation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested in some cases that
cooperation is not only inherent to federalism pragmatically understood,
but that it is to be encouraged and valued.
In Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, the
Court had to examine the constitutional validity of a federal-provincial
chicken marketing scheme which permitted a federal body to delegate its
authority to regulate the marketing of chickens, both inter-provincially
and extra-provincially, to a provincial body. The Supreme Court dismissed the challenge to the constitutionality of this delegation mechanism, noting that the federal-provincial agreement at stake “both reflects
and reifies Canadian federalism’s constitutional creativity and cooperative flexibility”.70 Jurisdictional entanglement being the logical offspring
of an overlapping conception of federalism, it renders cooperation
necessary, and a “benevolent” form of constitutional scrutiny must thus
be applied.
The same benevolent approach is observable in the 2010 case of
NIL/TU,O71 where the Court was asked to determine whether the labour
relations in an agency delivering services to Aboriginal families and
children fell under federal jurisdiction over “Indians”, even if such
services are normally presumed to be under provincial jurisdiction. In the
case at bar, a tripartite joint decision scheme had been set up. Justice
69
For similar types of arguments, see D. Weinstock, “Liberty and Overlapping Federalism”
in S. Choudhry, J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens & L. Sossin, eds., Dilemmas of Solidarity: Redistribution
in the Canadian Federation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), at 167; Robert A. Shapiro,
Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights (Chicago: University of
Chicago Law Press, 2009).
70
Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 292, at para. 15 (S.C.C.).
71
Supra, note 64.
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Abella, speaking for a group of six justices forming a majority as to the
reasoning (the outcome was unanimous), summarizes the working of that
scheme as follows:
NIL/TU,O’s operational features are painted with the same cooperative brush. The agency exists because of a sophisticated and
collaborative effort by the Collective First Nations, the government of
British Columbia and the federal government to respond to the
particular needs of the Collective First Nations’ children and families.
This effort has resulted in a detailed and integrated operational matrix
comprised of NIL/TU,O’s Constitution and by-laws, a tripartite
delegation agreement, an intergovernmental memorandum of
understanding, a set of Aboriginal practice standards, a federal funding
directive and provincial legislation, all of which govern the provision of
child welfare services by NIL/TU,O in a manner that respects and
protects the Collective First Nations’ traditional values.
By virtue of the memorandum of understanding and the tripartite
agreement, the federal government actively endorsed the province’s
oversight of the delivery of child welfare services to Aboriginal
children in the province, including those services provided by
NIL/TU,O to the Collective First Nations. I see this neither as an
abdication of regulatory responsibility by the federal government nor
an inappropriate usurpation by the provincial one. It is, instead, an
example of flexible and co-operative federalism at work and at
its best.72

These general observations helped her conclude that:
The essential nature of NIL/TU,O’s operation is to provide child and
family services, a matter within the provincial sphere. Neither the
presence of federal funding, nor the fact that NIL/TU,O’s services are
provided in a culturally sensitive manner, in my respectful view,
displaces the overridingly provincial nature of this entity. The
community for whom NIL/TU,O operates as a child welfare agency
does not change what it does, namely, deliver child welfare services.
The designated beneficiaries may and undoubtedly should affect how
those services are delivered, but they do not change the fact that the
delivery of child welfare services, a provincial undertaking, is what it
essentially does.73

72
73

Id., at paras. 43-44.
Id., at para. 45.
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While advocating a more robust application of the relevant functional
test in view of better protecting core federal jurisdictions from provincial
encroachments, McLachlin C.J.C., and Binnie and Fish JJ., did not
distance themselves from Abella J.’s remarks concerning cooperation.
Yet, a benevolent form of constitutional scrutiny in contexts evincing
intergovernmental cooperation does not mean that generic considerations
pertaining to cooperative federalism trump the application of the federal
division of powers. In Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community
Services Society,74 the Supreme Court had to examine the constitutional
validity of some provisions of the federal Controlled Drugs and Substances Act75 which, according to some parties to the dispute, unconstitutionally applied to provincial health facilities. Although the case was
ultimately decided against the federal government on the basis of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Court upheld the impugned provisions from the standpoint of the division of powers. In so
doing, it unanimously reiterated the primacy of an overlapping conception of federalism76 and the restrictive scope to be given to the doctrine
of interjurisdictional immunity,77 noting that this doctrine created a
tension “with the emergent practice of cooperative federalism, which
increasingly features interlocking federal and provincial legislative
schemes”.78 Interestingly, Insite, the safe injection facility that was bound
to close as a result of the federal government’s withdrawal of an exemption granted under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, was
characterized by the Court as a product of cooperative federalism,79 since
the competent levels of governments had originally decided to exercise
their respective jurisdictions in a way that was conducive to the creation
and operation of the facility. However, the court’s rejection of Insite’s
federalism-based challenge of the withdrawal of the exemption sends a
rather clear message as to the normative reach of the principle of cooperation, if any: the mere fact that a policy, a program or an institution
owes its existence to the practice of cooperative federalism does not
shield it from the strict application of the federal division of powers. In
this way, the Supreme Court effectively precludes the Canadian version
74
75
76
77
78
79

[2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS Community Services”].
S.C. 1996, c. 19.
PHS Community Services, supra, note 74, at para. 62.
Id., at para. 61.
Id., at para. 63.
Id., at para. 19.
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of cooperative federalism from creating the “joint-decision traps” that
have plagued more strongly integrated and interlocked federations, such
as Germany.80
That being said, an overlapping conception of federalism inevitably
presupposes a shift from a radically competitive understanding of
federalism, which often translates into strong claims of jurisdictional
exclusiveness over narrowly defined subject matters, to a more cooperative vision of federalism encouraging a shallower definition of these
subject matters. However, it is one thing to say that such a vision now
permeates the Supreme Court’s rhetoric; it is quite another to say that
cooperation has been elevated to the status of a normative standard that
would allegedly flow from the principle of federalism. Indeed, as seen
earlier, the Canada Assistance Plan Reference81 seems to indicate the
exact opposite. In this case, the principle of parliamentary supremacy
easily superseded any other potential federalism-inspired claim supporting a formal legal obligation to cooperate or to take into consideration
the other level of government’s interests, as opposed to jurisdictions,
when legislating.
It thus becomes overwhelmingly clear that the practical, political
need for cooperation between federal actors cannot be relied upon to
displace formal jurisdictional allocations or otherwise constitutionally
recognized constitutional principles with a well-defined normative
content. At best it can be argued that the Supreme Court implicitly
accepts the existence of a rebuttable presumption of reasonable cooperation between the federal government and the provinces.82 We are thus
light years away from a formal constitutional duty to cooperate that
would be deemed inherent to federalism. This does not mean, however,
that cooperation is not constitutionally valued, which is markedly
different from being compulsory. In this regard, the doctrine of comity
80
The term “joint-decision trap” was coined by Fritz W. Scharpf in “The Joint-Decision
Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration” (1988) 66 Public Administration 239.
81
Supra, note 34.
82
The roots of such a presumption can be traced back to the old Privy Council case of
Montreal (City) v. Montreal Street Railway, [1912] J.C.J. No. 1, [1912] A.C. 333 (J.C.P.C.). I
elaborate on this in J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Ethos of Canadian Aboriginal Law and the
Potential Relevance of Federal Loyalty in a Reconfigured Relationship between Aboriginal and
Non-Aboriginal Governments: A Thought Experiment”, in G. Otis & M. Papillon, eds., The
Relational Dimension of Indigenous Governance and Federalism: Theories and Practices (Ottawa:
University of Ottawa Press, forthcoming 2012).
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can be construed as imposing upon provinces’ occasional obligations to
cooperate, be it by refraining from interfering into another province’s
affairs (“passive cooperation”), or by recognizing rulings emanating from
another province (“active cooperation”). The doctrine of comity originates in customary international law, where it refers to obligations
imposed upon states to respect differences between their own legal
system and a foreign state’s legal system to which they turn for judicial
assistance, failure by the former to respect these differences being
characterized as a potential threat to the latter’s sovereignty. It has been
transplanted into federal settings, because relationships between the
various governments of a federation also raise interjurisdictional problems. There is no formal provision of the Constitution Act, 1867 enshrining comity-related obligations,83 but judicial interpretation, especially in
cases dealing with the extra-territorial effects of provincial legislation,
has made clear that the doctrine plays a key role in ensuring the orderly
functioning of the federation.84 In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De
Savoye, LaForest J., speaking for the entire Supreme Court, stated that:
… there is really no comparison between the interprovincial
relationships of today and those obtaining between foreign countries in
the 19th century. Indeed, in my view, there never was and the courts
made a serious error in transposing the rules developed for the
enforcement of foreign judgments to the enforcement of judgments
from sister-provinces. The considerations underlying the rules of
comity apply with much greater force between the units of a federal
state, and I do not think it much matters whether one calls these rules of
comity or simply relies directly on the reasons of justice, necessity and
convenience to which I have already adverted.85

The Supreme Court further mentioned that the extra-territorial application of an otherwise valid provincial legislation must be conditioned
by “the requirements of order and fairness that underlie our federal

83
Except, perhaps, s. 121 which, by prohibiting provinces from imposing duties and tariffs,
could arguably be read as iterating a form of comity-related negative obligation.
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Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] S.C.J. No. 135, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077
(S.C.C.); Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] S.C.J. No. 125, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (S.C.C.); Tolofson v. Jensen;
Lucas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gagnon, [1994] S.C.J. No. 110, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (S.C.C.).
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arrangements”.86 In other words, the application of such legislation
should not unduly interfere with the interests of the province where the
extra-territorial effects will materialize.
Although the doctrine of comity as it applies between provinces has
been granted full-fledged constitutional status,87 its normative potential
appears somewhat limited as far as imposing more systematic and
onerous cooperative duties upon Canadian federal actors is concerned.
Indeed, it is difficult to fathom how it could be expanded and strengthened outside of the circumstances generally giving rise to its application.
Thus, apart from exceptional circumstances, cooperation in the Canadian
federation is to be legally understood as imposing, at best, obligations of
means rather than obligations of results. This view seems comforted by
the Supreme Court’s anticipatory refusal to ever monitor the discharge of
the duty to negotiate identified in the Quebec Secession Reference,88
whose potential to outgrow the admittedly exceptional context in which
it was found to exist, except perhaps when a formal constitutional
amendment is contemplated, appears limited.
Another generic normative consequence derived from the principle
of federalism appears to be that of proportionality, which is itself linked
to a vision of the federation as both reflecting and embodying a specific
type of political equilibrium worth preserving. The observations made in
Binnie and LeBel JJ.’s majority opinion in Canadian Western Bank v.
Alberta89 regarding the sometimes problematic reach of the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity evidence the Court’s commitment to the
overarching importance of proportionality as a regulatory principle
informing the interpretation of the federal division of powers:
Further, a broad use of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity runs
the risk of creating an unintentional centralizing tendency in constitutional interpretation. As stated, this doctrine has in the past most often
protected federal heads of power from incidental intrusion by provincial
legislatures. The “asymmetrical” application of interjurisdictional immunity is incompatible with the flexibility and co-ordination required by
contemporary Canadian federalism. Commentators have noted that an
86
Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [2003] S.C.J. No. 39,
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 63, at para. 56 (S.C.C.).
87
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 44, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, at para. 55 (S.C.C.).
88
Supra, note 49, at paras. 88-90.
89
Supra, note 60.
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extensive application of this doctrine to protect federal heads of power
and undertakings is both unnecessary and “undesirable in a federation
where so many laws for the protection of workers, consumers and the
environment (for example) are enacted and enforced at the provincial
level” …. The asymmetrical effect of interjurisdictional immunity can
also be seen as undermining the principles of subsidiarity, i.e. that decisions “are often best [made] at a level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected” (114957 Canada Ltée
(Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241,
2001 SCC 40, at para. 3).90

More recently, the majority opinion in Reference re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act91 evinces similar concerns about “[t]he need to maintain the balance resulting from the division of legislative powers provided for in the Constitution Act, 1867.”92
The requirement that the actions of one level of government must not
unduly encroach on another level’s areas of jurisdiction is obviously not
specific to post-1980 federalism cases. However, a broader concern
about proportionality has arguably been expressed since the late 1970s
and early 1980s through various tests that seek, albeit imperfectly, to
prevent outcomes upsetting the balance of federalism. The first that
springs to mind is the one applicable where the national dimensions
branch of the federal power to legislate for the peace, order and good
government is invoked,93 which has indeed contributed, despite assertions to the contrary,94 to making more difficult the resort to the national
dimensions doctrine.95 A second test that to a lesser extent reflects a
concern for maintaining the federation’s equilibrium is the one applicable
to federal claims grounded on the general power to legislate over trade
and commerce.96

90

Id., at para. 45.
Supra, note 62.
Id., at para. 193. See also para. 246.
93
Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 48. See also Beetz J.’s opinion in Re Anti-Inflation Act
(Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (S.C.C.).
94
For example, Professors Brun, Tremblay and Brouillet argue in Droit constitutionnel, 5th
ed. (Cowansville, QC: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008), at 434, that rulings such as Crown Zellerbach
have contributed to transforming Canada into a quasi-federation the existence of which is maintained
simply as a result of a “tolerant attitude” of the federal government towards provinces.
95
R. v. Hydro-Québec, supra, note 47.
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General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 28,
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That being said, even if one considers proportionality to broadly inspire the adjudication of division of powers cases, the particular normative consequences flowing from this principle remain difficult to fathom,
absent further reference to a specific doctrine of interpretation of that
division of powers. Moreover, one may legitimately wonder to what
extent this broad concern for proportionality is peculiar to federalism.
Indeed, concerns for proportionality infuse so many areas of the law that
a scholar such as David Beatty has even argued that this principle
represents the “ultimate rule of law”.97 Yet, there are other ways to
address, in a more indirect way, questions pertaining to proportionality.
An increasingly important one lies in a reference to subsidiarity, which in
the Supreme Court’s own recent discourse, seems to be emerging as a
principle consubstantial to federalism.
It must first be noted that the main ideas underlying subsidiarity were
already incorporated in the Canadian law of federalism long before the
word “subsidiarity” was ever printed in a volume of the Supreme Court
reports.98 Indeed, explicit references to provincial inability in cases
dealing with Parliament’s powers to legislate for the peace, order, and
good government of Canada in view of addressing national concerns,99 or
to legislate under the trade and commerce power for equivalent purposes,100 reflect the main ideas underlying subsidiarity. The Quebec
Secession Reference’s vision of the federal structure as “distributing
power to the government thought to be the most suited to achieving the
particular societal objective having regard to this diversity”101 also
incorporates assumptions traditionally associated with subsidiarity.
Second, since the word “subsidiarity” made its first official appearance in the Supreme Court’s case law in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech,
Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town),102 a number of important cases
97

David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
P.W. Hogg, “Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers in Canada” (1993) 3 N.J.C.L. 341;
R. Howse, “Subsidiarity in All but Name: Evolving Concepts of Federalism in Canadian Constitutional Law” [hereinafter “Howse”] in H.P. Glenn, ed., Contemporary Law: Canadian Reports to the
1994 Congress of Comparative Law (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais 1995), at 701.
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Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 48.
100
GMC, supra, note 96.
101
Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 49, at para. 58.
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[2001] S.C.J. No. 42, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hudson”]. In this case,
L’Heureux-Dubé J. defined the principle of subsidiarity as “the proposition that law-making and
implementation are often best achieved at a level of government that is not only effective, but also
closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and
to population diversity” (at para. 3).
98

104

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

have evoked this principle.103 Most notably, it appears prominently in
Canadian Western Bank, where the majority opinion holds, quoting
Hudson, that “[t]he asymmetrical effect of interjurisdictional immunity
can also be seen as undermining the principles of subsidiarity, i.e. that
decisions ‘are often best [made] at a level of government that is not only
effective, but also closest to the citizens affected’.”104
The exact juridical status of subsidiarity remains somewhat ambiguous, though. Indeed, in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, where
the Supreme Court had to determine whether a municipality could adopt
a by-law prohibiting aerodromes on its territory, the majority, holding
that the said by-law encroached upon Parliament’s jurisdiction over
aeronautics, superbly ignored the subsidiarity-based argument made in
dissent by Deschamps J. The majority opinion in Lacombe was drafted
by McLachlin C.J.C. on behalf of herself, Binnie, Fish, Abella, Charron,
Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. Justice LeBel concurred with the majority as
to the outcome of the case, but supported Deschamps J.’s views as to the
problem posed by the majority’s use of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity in this case. Although he does not mention subsidiarity in his
concurring opinion, his approval of Deschamps J.’s views on interjurisdictional immunity, which were inspired by subsidiarity-related concerns, and his own preference for resolving the case by resorting to
federal paramountcy (as was by and large advocated in Canadian
Western Bank), seem to indicate LeBel J.’s intellectual proximity with
Deschamps J.’s views on subsidiarity. Interestingly, in Canadian Western
Bank, where significant emphasis was placed on subsidiarity, the majority opinion was co-signed by McLachlin C.J.C., as well as by Binnie,
LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ. Thus, five judges (excluding LeBel
J.) who had found relevant to refer to subsidiarity in Canadian Western
Bank, ignored it three years later. To say the least, this reveals the state of
normative flux in which it seems caught: when should it be relied upon,
for what purpose, and, most importantly, what does it mean?105 No clear
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For an interesting analysis of recent developments concerning subsidiarity, see Dwight
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answer on any of these questions emerges from the post-Canadian
Western Bank case law.
Just a few months after Lacombe, the Supreme Court again split on
the question of subsidiarity, but explicitly this time. In Reference re
Assisted Human Reproduction,106 a debate arose between two groups of
four judges as to what subsidiarity should entail in view of examining the
constitutionality of a federal statute regulating assisted reproduction.
Justice Cromwell, who was the swing vote in this case, did not specify
his views on the impact of subsidiarity. The federal government
grounded the constitutionality of that statute on Parliament’s power to
enact criminal laws regarding the protection of public health, while the
Quebec government contended that some of its most important provisions had the effect of regulating the practice of medicine and were
therefore infringing on provincial jurisdiction over hospitals, property
and civil rights, and matters of a merely local nature.
On the one hand, LeBel and Deschamps JJ., with whom Abella and
Rothstein JJ. concurred, anchored their analysis of the interpretive
doctrines of the division of powers within the principle-based framework
elaborated on in the Quebec Secession Reference, which they interpreted
as implicitly recognizing subsidiarity as a sub-principle inherent to that
of federalism. After a further examination of the pedigree of that subprinciple in Canadian constitutional law, they considered it to be “an
important component of Canadian federalism”,107 and, referring to
Hudson, gave it this meaning:
According to this principle, legislative action is to be taken by the
government that is closest to the citizen and is thus considered to be in
the best position to respond to the citizen’s concerns …108

They concluded as follows on the outcome of the case and on the role of
the principle of subsidiarity:
In sum, the conclusion that the impugned provisions, far from falling
under the federal criminal law power, relate instead to the provinces’
jurisdiction over hospitals, property and civil rights and matters of a
merely local or private nature is self-evident. If any doubt remained,
this is where the principle of subsidiarity could apply, not as an
independent basis for the distribution of legislative powers, but as an
106
107
108
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interpretive principle that derives, as this Court has held, from the
structure of Canadian federalism and that serves as a basis for
connecting provisions with an exclusive legislative power. If
subsidiarity were to play a role in the case at bar, it would favour
connecting the rules in question with the provinces’ jurisdiction over
local matters, not with the criminal law power … 109

In addition to disagreeing with their colleagues as to the outcome of the
case, McLachlin C.J.C., and Binnie, Fish and Charron JJ., adopted a
sharply different perspective on the relevance and meaning of subsidiarity. Speaking on their behalf, McLachlin C.J.C. rejected both the idea
that subsidiarity could be relied upon to limit the scope of a federal
power “to preserve space for provincial regulation”, and the ensuing
“connection argument” made by LeBel and Deschamps JJ.110 Particularly
interesting is the Chief Justice’s understanding of the subsidiarity
principle. She indeed seems to restrict the scope of that principle, as
discussed in Hudson, to cases where the level of government that is
closest to the matter regulated would be allowed, in areas of jurisdictional overlap, “to introduce complementary legislation to accommodate
local circumstances”.111 She concludes that:
[m]ore fundamentally, subsidiarity does not override the division of
powers in the Constitution Act, 1867. … Subsidiarity might permit the
provinces to introduce legislation that complements the Assisted
Human Reproduction Act, but it does not preclude Parliament from
legislating on the shared subject of health. The criminal law power may
be invoked where there is a legitimate public health evil, and the
exercise of this power is not restricted by concerns of subsidiarity.112

Thus, on the one hand, we have a group of four justices led by LeBel
and Deschamps JJ. who, in line with the majority opinion in Canadian
Western Bank, elevate subsidiarity to the status of an interpretive principle of the division of powers in general and of the scope of the jurisdictions therein allocated in particular; on the other hand, we have another
group of four justices led by McLachlin C.J.C. who, in spite of Canadian
Western Bank, seem to understand subsidiarity as applicable only in
109
Id., at para. 273 (emphasis added). Transparency requires me to disclose that in reaching
that conclusion, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. referred to some of my previous work.
110
Id., at para. 69.
111
Id., at para. 70 (emphasis added).
112
Id., at para. 72.
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cases of jurisdictional overlaps and as merely referring to relations of
complementarity between federal and provincial regulatory schemes.
What to make of these conflicting views? Several definitions have
been given to the principle of subsidiarity since its foundational modern
iteration in the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.113 Most
often, it is understood as referring to “the notion that lower levels of
government are inherently better situated to regulate sub-political forms
of human association or human relationships”.114 Although generally
correct, this definition is somewhat lacking in that it seems to rest on a
non-modifiable and univocal value judgment about the respective virtues
of lower level and upper level governmental interventions. In my view, a
better description of the subsidiarity principle would seek to avoid such
univocal judgments and to actualize the meaning of the principle in the
context of contemporary federations marked by numerous internal and
external challenges. Under this view, subsidiarity would necessarily
attempt to reconcile concerns for diversity and for efficiency, and to
provide minimal procedural parameters for determining under which
circumstances one of these values may trump the other. William Ossipow’s description of the principle neatly captures its main thrust:
The principle of subsidiarity is not univocal in designating the level of
decision. It indicates a preferable level (the lowest one possible), which
must be defensible from the perspective of the principles of political
dignity and autonomy. But it also incorporates a prudential clause
which seeks to ensure systemic safety: whenever the theoretically
optimal level is unable to accomplish a particular task, it is then up to
the other level to take responsibility for this task.115

This highlights the functionalist nature of subsidiarity, which is reflected in one of the principle’s most important recent legal iterations in
article 5(2) of the European Union Treaty. Although it reiterates a
113
This was done, first, by Leo XIII (Encyclical Letter, Rerum Novarum (Boston: St. Paul ed.,
1891)), and then by Pius XI (Encyclical Letter, Quadragesimo anno (Boston: St. Paul ed., 1931)).
114
Howse, supra, note 98, at 705.
115
W. Ossipow, “Architecture Fédéraliste et Exigence de Justice” (1998) 9 Philosophie
politique 113, at 127. This is my translation of:
Le principe de subsidiarité n’est pas univoque dans la désignation du niveau de décision.
Il indique un niveau souhaitable (le niveau le plus bas possible), défendable en termes du
principe de dignité politique et d’autonomie. Mais il incorpore également une clause
prudentielle visant à la sécurité systémique: au cas où le niveau théoriquement optimal se
révélerait incapable de réaliser une tâche, c’est à un autre niveau de prendre en charge
cette tâche.
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preference for actions undertaken by the lowest level of government,
article 5(2) also confirms that should this level of government be unable
to effectively achieve certain predetermined objectives, the higher level
of government could legitimately and legally assert jurisdiction in areas
of concurrent jurisdiction.116 In the European context, this has led to the
recognition that subsidiarity “has both a positive limb (the Union can
achieve better results than the regions) and a negative limb (the member
states are unable to achieve the objectives of the proposed action).”117
Subsidiarity is thus understood as “a means of determining the appropriate level of action, and is closely related to the concepts of necessity,
effectiveness, proportionality, or even good government. It has been
promoted as a means of reconciling the conflicting needs of unity and
diversity within the EU”.118
There is no need to examine further the particular fate of subsidiarity
in the European Union. However, for the purposes of this paper, three
observations can be drawn from the above. First, subsidiarity is not an
entirely neutral principle; it does indicate a preference, which can be
defended by resorting to considerations related to democracy, legitimacy
and accountability. As Tocqueville noted long ago, administrative
centralization runs the risk of reducing among the citizenry what he
called “l’esprit de cité” resulting from the proximity (or the impression
thereof) of governing bodies.119 This problem, however, can arguably be

116

This article reads as follows:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty
and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effect of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community
shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
See Treaty Establishing the European Community (February 7, 1992), art. 3b, O.J. (C224) 1, [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. 573. It is to be noted that reference to subsidiarity cannot be made “to question the
granting of powers to the Community by the Treaties, but only the exercise of those powers by the
passing of particular measures”. See Trevor C. Hartley, ed., European Union Law in a Global
Context: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 61.
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alleviated, at least in part, by well-designed institutions and democratic
processes ensuring the constant re-legitimation of such institutions.120
Second, complementarity in the context of subsidiarity is better envisaged as referring to the above-mentioned objective of systemic safety,
which boils down to allowing one level to regulate a matter when
demonstration is made that the other cannot efficiently do it.121 As
Dwight Newman puts it, “[a]t no stage does the principle assert a mere
complementary power by associations closer to the individual; it contains, indeed, a strong preference for the power of associations closer to
the individual over those more distant.”122 This preference can be
characterized as a juris tantum presumption; it can be reversed provided
there are sufficient data for doing so. The relation of subsidiarity to
“centralization” or “decentralization” is thus merely contingent.
Third, all things considered, it is probably preferable to envisage the
principle of subsidiarity as a rule of conflict whose role is to support the
implementation of the principle of autonomy inherent to any federal
regime. The autonomy in question, which benefits each level of government, is merely relative, however: it is exercisable only within a broader
juridical order — the federation — which cannot, and should not, be
instrumentalized by any level of government for its own ends.123 The
principle of subsidiarity’s role as a conflict rule is evinced by its use for
determining which governmental level bears the burden of proof in a
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On the importance of well-designed institutions to ensure the legitimacy of decisionmaking within federations, see, recently, Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation, Principles of Design
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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122
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situation giving rise to its application.124 As such, it precludes the highest
level of government from arbitrarily deciding to exercise a jurisdiction
that local governments may be in a better position to exercise.125
A further question raised by the application of the principle of subsidiarity concerns the definition to be given to the notion of “proximity”,
which is deeply ensconced in the logic underlying this principle. This
question is not peculiar to the Supreme Court of Canada’s musings about
subsidiarity, but it informs the Court’s internal debates about this principle. When, in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction, LeBel and
Deschamps JJ. argue that “[i]f subsidiarity were to play a role in the case
at bar, it would favour connecting the rules in question with the provinces’ jurisdiction over local matters, not with the criminal law
power”,126 they implicitly associate one level of government’s primary
jurisdiction over a field envisaged globally, as opposed to the other level
of government’s mere capacity to incidentally affect the same field, to
the notion of proximity implied by subsidiarity. The same logic is
discernible in Deschamps J.’s dissenting opinion in Lacombe, where she
states that
the governments that are closest to citizens and have jurisdiction over
land use planning should have reasonable latitude to act where the
central government fails to do so or proves to be indifferent. They have
such latitude as a result, inter alia, of the narrower test for protection,
that of impairment. In my view, not to consider the practical effect of
the legislation in determining whether the activities have been impaired
for the purposes of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity will
have long-term negative consequences.127

Here, subsidiarity is referred to as a normative vehicle through which the
government that is deemed to be the closest to the citizens (as far as land
124
V. Constantinesco, “Le principe de subsidiarité: un passage obligé vers l’Union européenne”, in L’Europe et le droit, Mélanges en hommage à J. Boulouis (Paris: Dalloz, 1991), at 41,
quoted in Valérie Michel, Recherches sur les compétences de la communauté (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2003), at 476.
125
If one assumes for the sake of the discussion that Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 48, and
GMC, supra, note 96, iterate the principle of subsidiarity in the Canadian context, the characterization of this principle as a conflict rule imposing specific evidentiary requirements highlights the
remarkably weak evidence that was accepted by the Supreme Court in both cases.
126
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of my previous work.
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use is concerned) is somehow given “the benefit of the doubt” when that
government is caught in a jurisdictional dispute with the other level of
government. Actually, it is as if the former was presumed constitutionally
competent because of its alleged proximity to the citizens. Moreover,
subsidiarity is relied upon to support a restrictive interpretation of a preexisting doctrine of interpretation, that is, interjurisdictional immunity.
By rejecting the “connection argument” invoked by the LeBel and
Deschamps JJ. in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction, the group
of judges led by the Chief Justice most certainly questions the understanding of proximity underlying Deschamps J.’s approach in Lacombe.
In light of the remarks above, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.’s conception
of subsidiarity is arguably closer to the common understanding of this
principle than that of McLachlin C.J.C. Yet, their lack of mutual understanding about the meaning, scope and consequences of subsidiarity as a
principle deemed inherent to federalism only highlights the problems
plaguing references to this broader principle since the early 1980s
references. Indeed, even when there seems to be an agreement between
the members of the Supreme Court as to the potential relevance of a
particular principle associated with federalism, their views on the actual
impact of that principle on the interpretation of the division of powers
may vary widely,128 sometimes to the point of being incommensurable.
The positivist-voluntarist and generic-historicist conceptions of federalism that divided the members of the Court in the early 1980s still divide
its new members today.

V. CONCLUSION
Long before norms collide, there are fractures which flow from culture
and sensitivities.129

The Patriation Reference and the Quebec Veto Reference certainly
are two of the most important opinions ever pronounced by the Supreme
128

An interesting illustration of this can be found in Lamer C.J.C.’s opinion in Ontario
Hydro, supra, note 41, where he agrees with Iacobucci J.’s abstract analysis of the principle-based
framework applicable to the case while significantly disagreeing about the application of that
framework in the instant case.
129
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culture et de la sensibilité.” See Jean Carbonnier, “Variations sociologiques”, in Écrits (Paris:
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Court of Canada. They took place at a time constitutional negotiations
were arguably a close second to hockey as Canada’s national sport. They
also emerged out of an era when Canadians still felt that something had
to be done to persuade Quebeckers not to leave the federation. Paradoxically, one of these opinions, the Quebec Veto Reference, further contributed to the latter’s feeling of alienation within Canada. Last, they
revealed, if need be, deep fracture lines regarding the interpretation of
Canadian federalism. In other words, they “haunt us still”.130
What is their legacy? On the political front, these opinions remind us
of a period of intense constitutional debates that shaped Canadian
political life for the decades to come. These opinions were preceded, in
1980, by the first referendum on Quebec sovereignty and followed by a
second one in 1995. This last referendum was itself prompted by two
failed attempts at amending the Constitution — the Meech Lake and
Charlottetown sagas — to undo the political damage resulting from the
1982 patriation of the Constitution without Quebec’s approval, a process
that was condoned by the Supreme Court in the Quebec Veto Reference.
In this respect, the Quebec Secession Reference can arguably be read as
an attempt to restore the Court’s battered legitimacy in the post-Quebec
Veto Reference era before a politically important segment of its audience:
Quebec.131 Yet, the Court’s rejection of a Quebec-centric vision of
Canadian duality has not been formally reversed. This persisting judicial
ambiguity, coupled with the political turmoil that followed the Meech
and Charlottetown debacles, has arguably contributed to the deepening of
the political rift between Quebec and the other Canadian political
communities, a rift that manifests itself as a growing reciprocal indifference. From the perspective of the Canada-Quebec debate and irrespective
of one’s opinion on its possible outcomes, the Canadian federation, as it
currently stands, sociologically speaking, can at best be characterized as
a community of comfort.132
130
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l’argumentation, 5th ed. (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2000).
132
On this, see J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Fetishism of Formal Law and the Fate of
Constitutional Patriotism in Communities of Comfort: A Canadian Perspective”, in J.E. Fossum, P.
Magnette & J. Poirier, eds., Ties That Bind: Accommodating Diversity in Canada and the European
Union (Brussels, Bern & Berlin: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009) 301.
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As far as the law of federalism is concerned, the legacy of the early
1980s references is also rather ambiguous. As was shown in this paper,
the two competing conceptions of federalism that then emerged are,
subject to minor variations, still informing judicial debates. And although
the Patriation Reference can possibly be credited for having rekindled
the flame of unwritten constitutionalism, albeit in the context of conventions rather than law proper, no real consensus has emerged concerning
the particular normative consequences that flow from the principle of
federalism. Absent any broadly shared intellectual framework positing
the parameters within which this principle is to be understood (as
opposed to identifying its specific normative consequences in particular
cases), it seems condemned to live a normative life marked by the
“unbearable lightness of being”.133 In other words, trite it was; trite it
risks remaining.
Although one cannot reasonably expect no judicial ambiguity whatsoever on the normative consequences of the principle of federalism in a
federation characterized by a multiplicity of often irreconcilable visions
of that political regime, is it too much to ask for the judicial identification
of stable parameters, which could be called sub-principles, that would
frame decision-making when formal constitutional enactments provide
little guidance as to how cases raising questions of federalism should be
solved? I do not think so. I have expounded in previous papers why, in
my view, implicit principles matter; why and when resorting to them is
legitimate, and why outright positivist rejections of them are ontologically and hermeneutically flawed; I shall not repeat myself here.134
Suffice it to say that it is possible, by referring to theoretical scholarship
on federalism and to comparative law, to identify sub-principles consubstantial to federalism. Such sub-principles could provide, in the daily life
of a federation, a deontic interval within which constitutional powers
can, or should, be exercised. These sub-principles, which may have
substantial and procedural dimensions, can be derived from the fundamental structural characteristics common to all federations, and adapted
to the particular institutional features of the Canadian federation and to
133
I am obviously referring here to Milan Kundera’s novel, The Unbearable Lightness of
Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).
134
See, inter alia, Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Quebec Secession Reference”, supra, note 57;
J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Underlying Principles and the Migration of Reasoning Templates: A
Trans-Systemic Reading of the Quebec Secession Reference”, in Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration
of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 178.
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its political tradition. Moreover, their identification can be inspired by the
dynamic that results from the presence of such generic and particular
structural characteristics. As well, these sub-principles refer us back to a
federation’s initial goals; those responsible for individuating them
assume an obligation to act in a manner that can reasonably be characterized as fostering those goals, or, to put it negatively, as not unduly
undermining the said goals. In this respect, these principles serve as
“optimization precepts”,135 the implementation of which responds to a
contextual logic of the possible.136 If formal constitutional provisions
constitute the grammar of federalism in a particular federation, these subprinciples form its syntax, and may bridge the gaps between text, subtext
and context, as well as that between law and politics. Subsidiarity
provides a good illustration of a procedural sub-principle of the sort
envisaged. Using that example, I want to stress that my contention is not
that there can always be agreement as to how subsidiarity may play out
in a particular case; it is simply that a shared definition of that principle
is possible if one looks at its pedigree and function, and that for the sake
of legal consistency and intelligibility, a court such as the Supreme Court
should strive to at least agree on the intellectual underpinnings of that
sub-principle. This is all the more important given the absence of any
consensual conception of federalism in Canada.
This call for a deeper judicial reflection on the normative underpinnings of the principle of federalism seems particularly urgent as the
Supreme Court is currently tackling, or is about to tackle, federalism
cases that pit against each other values such as autonomy, diversity and
efficiency, or interests that are pan-Canadian and provincial.137 Taking
federalism seriously arguably imposes upon the Court the heavier burden
of providing strong rather than merely good reasons in support of its
federalism rulings,138 which implies making better sense of all the
135

See Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2002).
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G. Zagrebelsky, “Ronald Dworkin’s Principle Based Constitutionalism: An Italian Point
of View” (2003) 1 I-CON 621, at 633.
137
The most important is, in my view, the following: In the Matter of a Reference by Governor in Council concerning the proposed Canadian Securities Act, P.C. 2010-667 (May 26, 2010).
138
Raymond Boudon states that:
[t]he notion of good reasons characterizes situations where a subject agrees with a
conclusion because he cannot find a better system of reasons than that which leads him
to that conclusion and where he feels an intuitive doubt about the validity of that system. In certain circumstances, this may induce him to look for better reasons. In other
circumstances, for example if they suit him, he will live with his doubts. … One may
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potential normative consequences of the principle of federalism. This
highlights the penultimate objective underlying the use of such a principle-based approach to federalism: to ensure that federalism-related
adjudication is grounded on strong reasons, whatever the outcome,139
rather than on mere petitions of principle or deeply entrenched preconceptions, and that it consciously and wilfully opens itself to diverse
perspectives on federalism, be they put forward in the name of democracy, efficiency, or of a certain conception of the political community.140
Such a principle-based approach, I insist, is entirely compatible with
the common law’s casuistic methodology, which is irreducible to both
constitutional literalism and radical indeterminacy. The legacy of the
early 1980s references commands us not to unduly raise our expectations
as to what the Supreme Court can do in view of solving complex legal
and political questions pertaining to the federation. But it also commands
us not to unduly lower them either.

have good reasons to believe in certain legends, especially when they have a functional
value; one would not put his hands in the fire to defend them, but, in many cases, there
is little interest in refuting them. Moreover, one is reluctant to question them. See
Raymond Boudon, Raison, bonnes raisons (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
2003), at 139 (translation).
139
As imposing a search for strong reasons supporting a particular decision over other possible
decisions, a principle-based approach to federalism such as that advocated in this paper seeks to
avoid ideological determinism at all costs. It is thus neither systematically decentralist nor
systematically centralist, and it would certainly be afflicted with a pathology should it become so, as,
in such a situation, the very same principle would always trump all competing ones in each and
every case. For a reflection on the importance of maintaining a balance in weighing the application
of principles deemed inherent to federalism, see J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Irreducible Federal
Necessity of Jurisdictional Autonomy, and the Irreducibility of Federalism to Jurisdictional
Autonomy” in S. Choudhry, J.-F. Gaudreault-DesBiens & L. Sossin, eds., Dilemmas of Solidarity:
Redistribution in the Canadian Federation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 185.
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